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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 18, 1985, Appellant, True-Flo Mechanical 
Systems, Inc. (hereinafter "True-Flo"), was incorporated and 
commenced business (all references are to the transcript of the 
hearing before the Industrial Commission of Utah Employment 
Compensation Appeals, hereinafter "Tr."). (Tr. 16) Subsequent 
to the incorporation, Denny M. Hoffman and Jackie K. Hoffman 
(hereinafter the "Hoffmans11), as buyers, purchased from Vaughn 
F. Johnson and Margaret Johnson personally (hereinafter the 
"Johnsons11) , husband and wife, as sellers, certain equipment and 
other assets owned by the Johnsons and previously used by Vaughn 
Johnson & Sons, Inc. to use in their existing business. The 
Hoffmans also purchased certain real property from the Johnsons 
personally. (Tr. 12-16) One of the buildings on this real 
property had previously been used by Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc 
and True-Flo leased from the Hoffmans this building, incurring 
and paying reasonable rent for its use. (Tr. 16) True-Flo also 
leased from the Hoffmans the equipment and other assets the 
Hoffmans purchased from the Johnsons. (Tr. 16) 
After the sale by the Johnsons to the Hoffmans, Mr. 
Johnson continued his business, Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc., out 
of his own home (Tr. 17-18). Subsequently, Mr. Johnson 
attempted to rescind the sale and has stated the contract for 
the sale of the land and equipment was not valid, and he wanted 
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Mr* Hoffman off the property so his business would not be 
affected. (Tr. 17) Mr. Johnson attempted to have Mr. Hoffman 
evicted. He barred the doors and changed the locks in an 
attempt to keep Mr. Hoffman out. (Tr. 20) As late as December, 
1985, Mr. Johnson openly stated he was still continuing his 
business, through his sons. (Tr. 17, 20) There have been 
numerous advertisements by Mr. Johnson to this effect. (Tr. 16) 
Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. owes arrearages to the 
Department of Employment Security. (Tr. 5, 6) The Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission (hereinafter "'Board of 
Review11) determined that True-Flo is a successor in interest to 
Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc., and is therefore liable for the 
arrearage obligations of Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL 
I. Whether the finding that Appellant is the successor 
in interest to Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. is supported by the 
evidence. 
II. Whether the finding that Vaughn Johnson & Sons, 
Inc. ceased operations is supported by the evidence. 
III. Whether the finding that Appellant purchased all, 
or nearly all, of the assets of Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. is 
supported by the evidence. 
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IV. Whether the legal conclusion that a leasing ar-
rangement is sufficient to constitute "acquiring11 the assets of 
Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. is correct. 
V. Whether the legal conclusion that Denny and Jackie 
Hoffman are personally liable for the arrearage obligations of 
Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. is proper in light of the fact that 
they were not parties to the action below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Appellant is not the successor in interest to 
Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. To be a successor, the tranteree 
employer must acquire all or substantially all of the transferor 
employer's assets and the transferor employer must discontinue 
operations. The unimpeached evidence at the hearing indicated 
that Appellant did not acquire any assets from the transferor 
employer, Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc., nor did the transferor 
employer discontinue operation.s 
II. The conclusion of the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission that the Hoffmans are personally liable 
for the unpaid contributions is invalid. The Hoffmans are not 
parties to this litigation, therefore, the Board of Review did 
not have standing to make such a determination. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
APPELLANT IS NOT THE SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST 
TO VAUGHN JOHNSON AND SONS, INC. 
Sections 35-4-7(c)(1)(C) and 35-4-17(f) of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as Amended) define and outline certain obliga-
tions and responsibilities of a successor. Under Section 
35-4-7, "If an employer has acquired all or substantially all 
the assets of another employer and the other employer had 
discontinued operations upon the acquisition,... the acquiring 
employer will be deemed a successor." Under this statute, two 
requirements must be met in order for succession to take place. 
First, the successor must acquire all or substantially all the 
assets of the transferor. Second, the transferor employer must 
discontinue operations. 
A. APPELLANT DID NOT "ACQUIRE" ANY ASSETS OF THE TRANSFEROR 
True-Flo has not acquired anything from the transferor 
employer, Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. Mr. Hoffman established 
True-Flo prior to any of the purchases in question. This is 
supported by the Articles of Incorporation of Appellant, filed 
with the Division of Corporations on September 18, 1985. The 
Hoffmans purchased certain assets from the Johnsons personally. 
True-Flo purchased nothing from the previous employer, nor did 
it purchase from the Johnsons personally. True-Flo entered into 
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a lease agreement with the Hoffmans after the Hoffmans purchased 
the assets from the Johnsons. 
The case law clearly points out that the word "acquire11 
means to become the owner of property. See, Weinberg v. 
Baltimore and A.R. Co., 88 A.2d 575; Wulzen v. Board of Sup'rs 
of City and County of San Francisco, 35 P. 353; Crutchfield v. 
Johnson and Latimer, 8 S.2d 412. The term "occupancy" is not a 
synonym for "acquired". See, Losch v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 87 
N.Y.S.2d 714. Therefore, to acquire is to procure the property 
and ownership thereof permanently. See, State Ex Rel. Fisher v. 
Sherman, 21 N.E.2d 467. 
The Board of Review and the administrative law judge 
held that True-Flo acquired the assets of Vaughn Johnson & Sons, 
Inc. This conclusion is contrary to the case law regarding the 
word "acquire". True-Flo does not own an interest in the 
property, but, rather, leases the property from the Hoffmans. 
Never at any time have any of the assets of the previous employ-
er been purchased or acquired by True-Flo. 
Additionally, the unimpeached evidence at the hearing 
indicates the Johnsons were the primary sellers of the equipment 
and not Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. (Tr. 12) 
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B. TRANSFEROR EMPLOYER HAS NOT DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS 
The evidence indicates that Mr. Johnson is still con-
ducting a business. The Appellant incorporated and began 
business during the time Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. was still 
actively engaged in business. When the Hoffmans purchased some 
of the assets of the Johnsons1, True-Flo did not receive any of 
the ongoing contracts, customer lists, accounts receivable or 
other assets of Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc., but, rather, simply 
leased property from the Hoffmans which had come from the 
Johnsons personally. The unimpeached evidence introduced at the 
hearing indicates that after selling the assets, Mr. Johnson 
still conducted his business out of his home and through his 
sons. This fact is supported, not refuted, by the subsequent 
finding of the Department that a cease and desist order was 
issued against Mr. Johnson by the Third District Court as late 
as December 1985. Even though the cease and desist order was 
issued, Mr. Johnson continued to operate his business. 
Unimpeached evidence shows Mr. Johnson attempted to evict Mr. 
Hoffman from the property he had sold, stating that True-Flofs 
presence was harmful to his business. Equity should not allow 
the Johnsons to sell certain assets in their personal capacity, 
continue in their business, and transfer a large obligation to 
True-Flo for delinquent employment taxes from Vaughn Johnson & 
Sons, Inc. 
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In essence, the statute U.C.A. 35-4-7(c)(1)(C) requires 
that the acquiring employer in actuality be purchasing the 
business of the transferor employer. This interpretation can be 
drawn from the statute itself which requires the acquiring 
employer to purchase substantially or all of the assets and the 
transferor employer must discontinue its operations. In the 
present case, True-Flo has purchased nothing from the transferor 
employer, but is simply leasing some of the assets from 
individuals. Because Mr. Johnson has not discontinued 
operations, the very terms of the statute are explicit that 
True-Flo is not a successor. Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. 
continues to be responsible for any obligation in arrears. 
The only evidence that Appellant is a successor to Vauhn 
Johnson & Sons, Inc. were statements allegedly may by Mr. 
Johnson, who was not present at the hearing. Although hearsay 
evidence is admissible in an administrative hearing at the 
administrative law judge's discretion, it may not be the only 
basis for a decision, nor may it be admissible if there is no 
reasonable basis for inferring liability. See, Trotta v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 664 P. 2d 1195 (Utah 1983). The 
administrative law judge and the Board of Review both relied on 
hearsay statements allegedly made by Mr. Johnson, a hostile 
party. True-Flo and Mr. Hoffman are presently involved in 
hostile litigation with Mr. Johnson. Because of these problems, 
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any representations made by Mr. Johnson to the Department are 
suspect. To rely solely on the hearsay evidence offered by a 
hostile party of the Appellant is grossly unfair. 
POINT TWO 
DENNY AND JACKIE HOFFMAN ARE NOT PARTIES 
TO THIS LITIGATION, THEREFORE, THE CONCLUSION 
OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
THAT THE HOFFMAN'S ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR 
UNPAID CONTRIBUTIONS IS INVALID 
This action was instigated against True-Flo as a succes-
sor to Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. for unpaid contributions to 
the State Unemployment Compensation Fund. At no time have the 
Hoffmans been parties to this action. In the decision of the 
Board of Review, Page 2, the Board of Review held that the 
Hoffmans were personally liable for the unpaid contributions of 
Vaughn Johnson & Sons, Inc. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence does not support the finding of the Board 
of Review that True-Flo is a successor in interest of Vaughn 
Johnson & Sons, Inc. Additionally, the Board of Review reached 
an improper legal conclusion in interpreting the word 
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"acquired." The decision of the Board of Review should be 
reversed holding that True-Flo is not a successor in interest. 
DATED this day of August, 1986. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
By: , 
Richard K. Glauser 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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